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FCH1, LLC v. Rodriguez, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 46 (June 05, 2014)1
TORTS
Summary
The Court determined two issues: 1) whether to extend the limited-duty rule established
in Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entertainment, 124 Nev. 213, 220–21, 180 P.3d 1172, 1177
(2008), to the facts of this case;2 and 2) whether Palms breached the duty of reasonable care it
owed to Rodriguez.
Disposition
Assuming, but not deciding, that the rule established in Turner could be extended,
“extending it to the circumstances before us here would be a bridge too far.” Also, where the
testimony the district court excluded may have resulted in a different verdict on the issue of a
breach of the duty of reasonable care, a new trial is warranted.
Factual and Procedural History
I.
Respondent Rodriguez sued the Palms Resort for damages resulting from a knee injury
sustained while sitting at a sportsbook bar watching football on television. The injury resulted
from another patron diving for a sports souvenir thrown into the crowd by an actress hired by the
Palms for the event. Rodriguez sued the Palms for negligence.
During the bench trial, several of Rodriguez’s treating physicians testified to the severity
of his condition, the appropriateness of treatment, the nature of his condition, and the cause of
his condition. The district court struck the testimony of Palms’ experts on economics, crowd
control, and security because they did not state that their opinions were given to a reasonable
degree of professional probability. The district court found Palms liable as a matter of law and
awarded respondent $6,051,589 in damages.
Discussion
II.
The Court analyzed the claim as one based on premises liability, because that is how both
parties and the district court analyzed the claim. A premises owner or operator generally owes
guests a duty to exercise reasonable care 3 , but the duty may be limited by courts 4 . Courts
typically make such limitations with sports venues, as this Court did in Turner. 5 Palms
analogizes the facts in this case to those in Turner.
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By Michael Bowman
In Turner, the Court held that a duty owed an attendee of a baseball game was limited to protecting her from an
“unduly high risk of injury.” In that case, the Court held that a “known, obvious, and unavoidable part of all
baseball games” does not present such a risk.
3
Foster v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 71, 291 P.3d 150, 152 (2012).
4
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496C cmt. d (1965); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm §
7(b) (2010); see also Turner v. Mandalay Sports Ent., L.L.C., 124 Nev. 213, 220–21, 180 P.3d 1172, 1177 (2008).
5
See Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Cal. 2012).
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In Turner, a baseball game attendee was struck by a foul ball while seated in an
unfenced “Beer Garden.6 The Court held that the foul ball did not pose an unduly high risk of
injury because it was an avoidable, obvious, and known part of all baseball games.7 In adopting
that rule, the Court followed longstanding precedent that limited the duty owed by baseball
stadium owners to attendees.8 In this case, Rodriguez’s injury while he was watching television
at a bar, not while attending a live game, and he was hit by another patron and not a piece of
equipment involved in the game.
Palms argued that tossing items to fans at sporting events is a well-accepted activity and
therefore the risk involved cannot be extinguished without changing the fundamental nature of
the event. However, even if the Court was willing to extend Turner, it could not agree that any
risk of injury inheres in watching a televised sporting event at a casino bar.
The Court noted that the point of watching a live baseball game is to watch players hit
baseballs and the hope of spectators of catching the ball, so hitting cannot be eliminated from the
activities. In contrast, the Court stated that the point of watching a game at a sports bar is to
watch a game at a sports bar. Additionally, the Court noted that having items tossed in a sports
bar may enhance the experience but so long as the televised event is viewable in that venue the
activity retains its character. If the owner of the bar declines to have actors toss items at
attendees, patrons can still watch the game. The key is that once the injury-causing conduct has
strayed too far from the core activity the limited-duty doctrine is inapplicable.
The Court held that even if Turner could be extended, “extending it to the circumstances
before us here would be a bridge too far.”
III.
Palms’ expert on crowd control and security opined that throwing souvenirs into crowds
is generally safe and not uncommon. He narrated his experience working crowd control at
events where promoters threw items into crowds and indicated that he knew of no injuries. His
testimony suggested that the Palms’ conduct was safe and routine. Furthermore, the testimony
suggested that the respondent’s injury was not foreseeable and that the Palms acted reasonably.
Respondent did not present any expert testimony in opposition. Therefore, such testimony could
have altered the outcome of the case.
However, the district court struck the testimony because the expert did not state that he
testified to a reasonable degree of probability. The Court held that “rather than listening for
specific words the district court should have considered the purpose of the expert testimony and
its certainty in light of its context.”9 In this case, the expert testified that his opinion was based
on years of experience and that he never read anything that mandates that it shouldn’t be done.
The Court found that he offered a definitive opinion based on experience and research.
Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion to exclude his testimony. Because it is probable that the
testimony the district court excluded may have resulted in a different verdict on the issue of
Palms’ breach, a new trial is warranted.10
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124 Nev. at 216, 180 P.3d at 1174.
Id. at 216–19, 180 P.3d at 1174–76.
8
See W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 485 (5th ed. 1984).
9
See Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 45, 262 P.3d 360, 368 (2011).
10
Cook v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., L.L.C., 124 Nev. 997, 1009, 194 P.3d 1214, 1221 (2008).
7

Conclusion
IV.
Here, declining to extend the limited-duty rule to the facts of this case, the Court held that
“there was no error in the district court’s refusal to find, as a matter of law, that Palms owed no
duty of care.” Furthermore, because it is probable that the testimony the district court excluded
may have resulted in a different verdict on the issue of Palms’ breach, a new trial is warranted.

